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In this article we suggest that rising quality requirements are key factors for the re-
design of food chains. We argue that the food supply proceeds through pyramidal-
hierarchical strategic networks coordinated by powerful focal firms. These firms 
choose a quality strategy and employ chain quality management concepts by 
exerting managerial discretion to achieve the super-ordinate network aims. We 
introduce and elaborate upon two types of chain quality management: strategic and 
operative. The theoretical findings have been tested using evidence from the Polish 
dairy market. Semi-structured interviews were conducted across the various 
hierarchical levels of the 19 largest Polish dairy cooperatives during the spring of 
2006. The results show that the firms’ activities are generally aligned with current 
market opportunities for optimal enterprise performance. Thus, we determined that 
manufacturers of well-branded products create an advanced network structure and 
apply strategic quality management. Networks that have a focal company acting as 
an external customer of a processor use operative quality management. Some Polish 
dairies are still not embedded in any supply chain networks; no chain quality 
management concepts can be installed in these chains because they have no 
powerful focal firm. 
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Collaborative relationships in the food chain have been gaining in importance in the 
agro-food business for many years. Indeed, today’s vertical collaborations are as 
important as the horizontal cooperation that emerged when the first cooperatives 
were established. Many factors have influenced this development in general, and 
particular factors are present on every level of the food chain (Duysters et al. 2004, 
Dyer/Nobeoka 2000, Gulatti et al. 2000). Because many articles have been written 
on the verticalization of the agro-food business, we refrain from analyzing it once 
again. Overall, there are two main factors: 1) obtaining higher efficiency due to cost 
reductions and 2) assuring the demanded food quality and security. In this article, 
we focus on quality management in vertical collaborations. 
 
As we focus on food quality, we must bear in mind that the understanding of quality 
differs along the whole food chain. While food safety, freshness, taste, and animal 
welfare are highly relevant to consumers, retailers and manufacturers are also 
concerned with functional points such as production specificities and required 
technological parameters. Because consumers determine the marketing success of 
goods in saturated markets, their wishes and demands influence the entire 
production process (Andersen 1994, Hanf 2000). Therefore, we will place special 
emphasis on certain developments that are steered by consumers. 
 
As people have become more affluent and educated about food over the past two 
decades, their perceptions and expectations of “good” food have changed. Consumer 
concerns about food quality and safety have dramatically increased by numerous 
food scandals such as the Coke scandal in Belgium, the Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in the UK, and the wine scandal in Austria and 
Germany (Böcker/Hanf 2000). In this context, the crisis of winter 2000-01 can be 
regarded as the straw that broke the camel’s back. Therefore, consumers perceived 
BSE and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) as perhaps the doomsday of modern food 
processing. Because consumers have trouble verifying the characteristics of food 
safety, they, as well as politicians and the press, unanimously clamored for 
transparency in the whole production process. The most striking consequence of the 
above food scares was the fact that all agribusiness stakeholders assessed food 
quality as no longer being the responsibility of a single firm. Instead, it was 
recognized that the whole food chain needs to work together to deliver the “new 
quality” (Hanf/Hanf 2005). 
 
Overall, the abovementioned incidences have catalyzed the development of quality 
management concepts that overlap a firm’s boundaries. In recent years, a large 
number of proposals for “chain quality management” were widely discussed and the 
first quality management processes have already been implemented. Such concepts 
are either all-sector approaches - such as the German QS-system - or individual 
firms’ approaches. Because all-sector approaches can only provide a competitive Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
 
© 2007 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
104
advantage (if at all) for early adapters, individual approaches have to be used. In 
this way they can be regarded as strategic instruments for creating a unique selling 
proposition. Since supply chain networks now compete with each other, we argue 
that individual approaches have to cover the whole supply chain. Therefore, chain 
quality has to be used as a strategic parameter. Chain quality is a result of 
cooperation, so we further assume that using chain quality strategically leads to 
more intense relationships among partners. On the contrary if, chain quality is only 
used to gain parity with competing networks, weaker relationships have to be 
installed. Thus, chain quality management concepts are expected to significantly 
differ from each other. 
 
Based on these considerations, our paper aims to work out the differences between 
strategic and operative chain quality management concepts and test our theoretical 
findings using evidence from an emerging industry. We have chosen Poland because 
it is a new European Union (EU) member. In that market, the firms’ changing 
environment, including legal and voluntary obligated requirements and ongoing 
restructuring processes at all stages in the food chain (Pieniadz 2006) may cause 
unique developments, as far as quality management is concerned. In this respect, 
our thesis is that quality management concepts are still an emerging field and 
might be used as a differentiating instrument. 
 
Our article is structured as follows. In section two we will discuss quality and its 
challenges and consequences for the participants of the agro-food business, and 
hence introduce the concept of supply chain networks. Section three deals with 
general demands on chain quality management. Furthermore, we introduce 
strategic quality chain management as well as operative quality chain 
management. In the fourth section we will present our empirical survey in Poland 




Verticalization of the Agro-food Business 
 
We have recently been able to observe that the traditional mode of exchange has 
been altered along the food chain. The exchange of products has traditionally been 
coordinated through spot market transactions; today, more and more transactions 
are carried out within hybrids or between vertically-integrated firms (Boehlje 1999, 
Brito/Roseira 2005, Fritz/Schiefer 2002, Neves 2003). Several important factors 
have brought this development about, such as efficiency gains through 
collaboration, customer requirements, etc. In this article, however, we will focus on 
food quality as one of the key drivers for the re-design of food chains. 
 
Because quality is a multi-dimensional construct, different perspectives have to be 
analyzed (Hanf/Kühl 2004). Thus, some important implications can be drawn: (1) Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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quality attributes must be recognized by the customers (external customers such as 
consumers and business customers, as well as intra-firm customers); (2) the whole 
production process must be included; and (3) the product must fit the relationship-
specific requirements (Garvin 1987). For developed countries, food safety can be 
regarded as a compulsory part of food quality. 
 
However, food crises have alerted consumers to their inability to prove certain food 
products characteristics. One result has been a sharp reduction in demand for 
specific food items (Böcker/Hanf 2000). The aforementioned BSE/FMD crisis in the 
winter of 2000-01 caused a sharp reduction in the consumption of conventionally 
produced red meat and red meat products. Correspondingly, a sharp increase was 
observed in the consumption of substitutes such as fish, poultry, and cheese. 
Consequently, firms, as well as politicians, realized that there is an increased 
demand for food safety concepts. 
 
It was assumed that the BSE problem was rooted in a malpractice at the farm-
supplier level. Therefore, food safety concepts should contain information on the 
whole food chain, in particular, information should be provided on the monitoring 
and control of the whole food production process so that increasing traceability can 
be observed (Schulze et al. 2006, Theuvsen 2004). Furthermore, many factors - such 
as failing to remember, bounded rationality, asymmetric information, and time 
constraints - influence consumers’ buying decisions. Hence, consumers will not be 
able, or will not be willing, to intensively and completely prove the quality of food 
products, although they may continue looking for signals to ease their buying 
decisions, e.g. for a well-known brand or a quality certificate. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that branded products outperformed unbranded products (Hanf/Kühl 
2005). The demand for organically produced food increased significantly during the 
BSE/MFD crisis because those products have a trustworthy image and are certified 
throughout the whole production process. This demonstrates that the reliable 
transfer of experience and credence attributes to consumers can be used as a basis 
for creating a unique selling proposition, which is not a matter of food safety 
(Hanf/Kühl 2005). 
 
Moreover, as there is a tendency for consumers to demand more chilled and fresh 
food and fruits, the processing time - from harvest to consumption - must be 
reduced. Thus, the time to market throughout the whole food chain is a strategic 
element of collaboration. For example, a well-known German discount retailer 
demands that their lettuce producers harvest, process, and distribute their products 
nationwide within twelve hours. Today's business customers also demand highly 
specified goods and commodities for their modern processing machines. The 
specifications are secured via contracting, as well as requiring specific process 
standards. Furthermore, total quality management concepts, “kaizen” as well as 
“six sigma”, have shown that applying quality improvement measures along the 
whole supply chain leads to significant cost reductions, as well as efficiency gains.  Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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Today’s food quality demands lead to product and information flows that overlap 
firm boundaries as well as food chain stages. Thus, food quality is no longer the 
responsibility of a single firm. Instead, all directly or indirectly contributing actors 
of a specific food chain need to work together (Hanf/Hanf 2005). In most cases, such 
systems demand the formation of hybrid organizations.  
 
Management of Vertical Collaborations 
 
Hybrid organizations that comprise more than two firms are called networks 
(Menard 2002, Omta et al. 2001, Picot et al. 2001, Zylbersztajn/Farina 2003). A 
more detailed approach to networks is taken by Burr (1999), who classifies four 
types, i.e., the spontaneous network, the self-organizing network, the project–
orientated network, and the strategic network. This typology is derived from the 
intensity of relation, the coordination mechanism, and the existence of a broker. 
Because food supply chains can be characterized as pyramidal-hierarchical 
networks, we focus on strategic networks. A focal company builds the core element 
of the network; it is either the manufacturer or retailer, and it is also the 
centralized decision-making unit (Jarillo 1988). Thus, the focal company determines 
the decisions of all network members, including the choice of measures, to ensure 
the super-ordinate network aims are met (Wildemann 1997). Because long-term 
explicit or implicit contracts are commonly used as governance instruments, the 
network actors are more or less heavily dependent on the focal company. However, 
the level of dependency is usually higher for vertical than for horizontal ties 
(Wildemann 1997). 
 
Following the strategic network perspective, all decisions and actions of the 
participating firms are influenced by the purpose of collaboration, and also depend 
on each other (Astley 1984, Bresser/Harl 1986, Carney 1987, Edström et al. 1984). 
Firms can be embedded in the network through a variety of relationships, creating 
multiple interdependencies and partnerships; there are pooled, sequential, and 
reciprocal interdependencies among the partners. Lazzarini et al. (2001) propose to 
exert managerial discretion for sequential (vertical) interdependencies, whereas for 
pooled interdependencies they recommend the achievement of process 
standardization, and for reciprocal interdependencies they recommend coordination 
through mutual adjustments. Inter-organizational cooperation of such a complex 
network requires a great deal of coordination, and hence, cooperation management 
(Arbeitskreis 1995, Bogaschewsky 1995, Gulati/Singh 1998, Gulati et al. 2005). 
Collective network strategies must be implemented to overcome coordination 
difficulties that arise from the various interdependencies. Collective strategies are 
defined as systematic approaches by collaborating organizations, which are jointly 
developed and implemented (Astley/Fombrun 1983, Bresser 1989). 
 
Partnerships are an integral aspect of chain management, especially when designed 
with upstream and downstream stages and supporting services that are adequate to Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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the network strategy. Generally, partnerships exhibit a certain degree of continuity 
and the focus of the relationships extends beyond price (Mentzer et al. 2000). 
Considering supply chain networks and the heterogeneity of their members, 
however, it can be expected that the optimal mode of partnerships will vary widely 
along the whole chain. This means that the focal company must determine 
partnership design. However, this does not mean that contractual arrangements or 
different modes of governance must be established to guide a partnership. Instead, 
literature reveals that the term partnership describes a multifaceted construct 
ranging from operational to strategic partnering (Mentzer et al. 2000, Webster 
1992). 
 
Strategic partnering is defined as an “on-going, long-term, inter-firm relationship 
for achieving strategic goals, which deliver value to customers and profitability to 
partners” (ibid. p.550). The aim of strategic partnering is to improve or entirely 
alter a company’s competitive position through the development of new products 
and technologies, as well as by creating new markets (Webster 1992). Additionally, 
strategic partnering should also include exclusivity and non-imitability (Mentzer et 
al. 2000). There is no set formula for the contracts used in case of strategic 
partnering. However, long-term oriented, formal and informal contracts addressing 
partnership-specific and relatively tight agreements dominate. 
 
Operational partnering is defined as a “needed, short-term relationship for 
obtaining parity with competitors” (ibid. p.550). Thus, an operational partnering 
strategy seeks to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, especially by 
reducing transaction costs. Such strategic orientation is manifested in employing 
loose contracts containing rather general information on price, quantity, and 
quality. Operational partnership involves shorter time spans and less 
organizational resources, and therefore is much easier to implement (and reverse) 
than strategic partnership. 
 
Additionally, following the work of Das/Teng (2001) we assume that trust and 
control are inextricably interlinked with risk perception. We argue that minimizing 
risks such as performance (i.e., quality output) and relational risks is of paramount 
importance in strategic partnering. Thus, we draw a hypothesis that due to the 
risks-minimization objective, control intensity and costs will be much higher by 
strategic partnering than by operational partnering. Furthermore, we argue that as 
strategic partnering develops, control-based agreements will be increasingly 
substituted by trust-based agreements. Following the suggestions of the above-
mentioned authors, relational risk can be reduced through goodwill trust, while 
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Quality Management in Supply Chain Networks 
 
In order to elaborate on quality management issues in the agro-food sector, we 
assume that the food supply proceeds in pyramidal-hierarchical strategic networks. 
This implies that there is a powerful focal firm in a supply chain network (SCN). 
This focal enterprise is able to exert managerial discretion so that the chain quality 
management concept has to be installed by all actors throughout the network. As a 
result, each must share a homogeneous understanding of quality management, 
which provides - at least theoretically - the preconditions of the emergence of a 
collective strategy, and thus collective actions, which address this strategy 
(Hanf/Dautzenberg 2006). 
 
We have shown that several factors caused the changing functions of food products. 
However, criteria such as time to market, reliability, maintainability, and cost 
savings, as well as traceability, are all related to the transparency of the network 
structure and its business transactions. Theuvsen (2004), in his paper on 
transparency, divides transparency into historical, operations, and strategic 
transparency. Historical transparency can be supported by use of tracking and 
tracing systems and labeling technologies. On the operational level, transparency 
deals with information exchange through the network’s human resources to 
coordinate the business activities. In this respect, division of labor and principal–
agent problems can lead to information asymmetries and therefore imperfect 
coordination along the supply chain. Both legal and voluntary obligated standards 
are widely used to reduce these hold-ups. If strategic information, which 
corresponds to the strategic goals and visions of the SCN, and specific information 
such as goods in stock, scanner data, etc., are distributed within the network, 
Theuvsen (2004) speaks of strategic transparency. 
 
Another essential task of quality chain management is developing a positive 
reputation. This can only be accomplished if the utilized leading and directing 
mechanism manages to create and disseminate confidence in food beyond credence 
attributes such as food safety. Because food quality hazards can enter the food 
chain at any stage, adequate control and communication throughout the network, 
as well as the loyalty of the supply chain partners, are essential (Das/Teng 1998, 
Inkpen/Tsang 2005, Uzzi 1997, Uzzi/Gillespie 2002). Therefore, the chain quality 
management system must be designed to include governance structures in the 
sense of partnering. However, depending on the internal network objective, the 
optimal design of the subsequent partnership structure varies for each SCN. 
Consequently, no discrete phase in the development of partnerships in a market can 
be distinguished. To overcome this inseparability, we introduce two hypothetical 
types of chain quality management: strategic and operative. It should be much 
easier to formulate an integrated and consistent management system with such a 
division. 
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We assume that a powerful focal firm in the SCN has consequences for the 
subsequent interdependencies within the network. In particular, the focal company 
has to be able to exercise managerial discretion for sequential interdependencies. 
Because secure food, cost efficiency, and time to market are now considered as 
competitive requirements (Tuten/Urban 2001, Ulaga/Eggert 2006), all chain quality 
management systems must address these topics. Thus, the chain quality 
approaches draw mainly upon standardization systems that primarily address 
pooled interdependencies. These systems are supplemented by standard approaches 
to historical transparency and operations transparency requirements. An example 
of industry-wide vertical standardization systems are the standards designed by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), whereas the “International 
Food Standard” (IFS) or Standards of the “British Retail Consortium” (BRC) are 
examples of horizontal systems. 
 
Operative quality management: This system is designed to ensure that all business 
operations required to meet the chosen quality strategy are effective and efficient. 
For this reason, two complementary measures can be used. First, mechanisms 
addressing historical and operational transparency, e.g. tracing and tracking 
systems, are used to gain parity with competing supply chain networks. Second, the 
network is fortified by the selection of partners. Such gains in efficiency and 
effectiveness are essential because consumers are not willing to pay a premium 
price for standard products, and the implementation and maintenance of quality 
assurance systems is costly. Collaborative relationships can be perpetuated over 
time only if the costs are offset by respective gains. Because this quality 
management approach aims to cut costs, an operational partnering strategy is used. 
Hence, the relationships are not so intensive and are not long-term. 
 
Strategic quality management: The focal firm can try to use the operative quality 
management system to create long-term, enduring competitive advantages by 
adding strategic components. Thus, these selected partners have to accept 
additional quality attributes and norms higher than the basic standards. We think 
that special credence attributes can be used to create additional value propositions. 
Based on credence attributes, the subsequent strategic partnering concept is hard to 
imitate and the benefits are exclusive to the members of the respective SCN. A 
collective quality strategy must be developed to permanently establish strategic 
quality management. Furthermore, the management concept has to consider the 
arising interdependencies across diverse partnerships, as well as the strategic 
transparency. Additionally, trust must be established between the partners and a 
culture of honesty must be created to develop mutual adjustment when addressing 
reciprocal interdependencies. Referring to the specificity of strategic quality 
management, inter-firm coordination in SCN follows unique and well-defined 
organizational principles that can also be idiosyncratic to the network and difficult 
to imitate as well. 
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These considerations suggest that the entire SCN can be sustained and maintained 
while strategic quality management is practiced. However, building up and 
maintaining such a network requires the selection of adequate governance 
mechanisms, the development of inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines, and 
relationship-specific investments and initiatives for necessary changes in the 
partnership structure (Dyer/Singh 1998). This all means that any focal actor must 
first compare the benefits and costs of the alternative quality management schemes 
and hence network structures. Thus, neither operative nor strategic quality 
management is better. The critical point is to choose the quality approach which 
best fits the overall network aims and its performance. Thus, operative quality 
management is usually the right approach for a cost leadership strategy, whereas a 
strategic quality management approach is usually best for a differentiating 
strategy.  
 
Relevance of Chain Quality Management in Poland  
 
In this section, we test our theoretical framework on chain quality management in 
the Polish dairy sector. Thus, we analyze (i) the type of prevailing quality 
understanding, as well as which quality schemes are used, (ii) the types of 
relationships that are present, and (iii) whether firm boundaries overlapping 
collective quality strategies exist. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
We surveyed 19 of the 22 largest Polish dairy cooperatives during February and 
March 2006. Roughly equal numbers of semi-structured interviews were conducted 
across the different hierarchical levels in the coops, including chief executive 
officers, quality managers, and supervisors in the marketing and supply 
departments. The sequence of the questioned representatives was the same for each 
coop. The interviews were conducted by telephone and lasted between 20 and 40 
minutes per respondent. Details on the participating firms can be found in the 
appendix (tables 1 and 2). 
 
The applied technique makes particular sense in view of the abovementioned 
research questions. On the one hand, chain quality management, as well as 
networks, concern activities and processes that are not easy to quantify and may 
even be ambiguous or misunderstood. On the other hand, the topics are particularly 
sensitive in emerging markets. Moreover, in those markets we expect some unique 
and relevant developments, which must be first recognized, while at the same time 
giving the respondents some freedom to explore our general views. Understanding 
the peculiarities of the investigated sample is crucial, since it allows for refining our 
theoretical assumptions, and hence a better interpretation of the findings. 
Following the inductive approach of Patton (2002) we began our analysis by 
collecting the perceptions of each representative in a dairy regarding the Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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abovementioned research questions (i-iii). The primary emphasis was on in-depth 
understanding of each individual case and on defining a set of all possible outcomes 
before those unique cases were compared and grouped. Thus, to obtain a first 
insight on the strategic orientation of a coop, we began with the opinions, 
perceptions and visions of the chief executive officer who represented the decision-
making unit. Next, all other respondents of a coop were invited to express their 
views regarding the general questions (i-iii). However, focus was placed on 
gathering detailed information concerning the corresponding department. For 
example, supply department supervisors were asked a number of open-end 
questions regarding: the design and intensity of relationships at the procurement 
stage, i.e., duration, stability and sustainability of the supplier-processor 
relationships; existing forms of commitments (agreements, implicit/ explicit 
contracts); intensity and topic of consulting and financial assistance (i.e., shared 
investments), and finally, issues regarding quality assurance (risk perception, 
control and trust, quality-related payment schemes). 
 
We considered two dimensions of quality management (operative and strategic) as 
being opposite ends of a spectrum. The applied inductive approach allowed us to 
identify the indicators of the two poles by complementing the theoretical hypothesis 
with the empirical findings. Thus, in the second stage of the analysis we clustered 
the identified indicators and obtained a polar space defined by operative and 
strategic quality managements. 
 
The key indicator that marks operational quality management is the network aim 
of gaining parity with the competing networks regarding food quality. This strategic 
orientation is often accompanied by the aim of achieving cost leadership, meaning 
that generic products are provided at the cheapest possible prices and all products 
are non-premium brands. The standardization systems address history and 
operation transparency requirements (i.e., IFS, ISO 9000). The relationships are 
short- or medium-term and operational partnering schemes dominate both the 
downstream and the upstream stages (transaction costs reduction). The parties 
apply either loose, flexible long-term contracts or detailed short-term contracts. In 
the case of loose contracts, the agreements fix the duration of partnership, payment 
schemes and general quality requirements, but leave the amount or composition of 
delivery, as well as the price, to be ongoing adjusted. Short-term contracts are 
rather explicit and detailed, covering many specifications, with quality and timely 
delivery being of paramount importance. 
 
The first identifiable pattern that can be ‘generalized’ in the case of strategic quality 
management is the existence of a collective chain quality strategy. This system is 
designed to create long-term, enduring competitive advantages using quality as a 
differentiating parameter. Thus, the strategy is indicated by the existence of 
additional quality attributes (credence) exceeding domestic consumer needs 
(environmental, social justice) or the creation of premium brands. The applied Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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quality assurance schemes are higher than basic standards. The parties develop 
and maintain unique partnership concepts, which are hard to imitate. Some 
indicators are long-term collaborations, shared and relationship-specific 
investments, mutuality, strategic transparency, a high level of control/trust to 
minimize risk, co-marketing (at the distribution stage) and the provision of business 
angels (at the procurement stage). The applied contracts are long-term and address 
both partnership-specific and relatively tight agreements (at the distribution stage) 
or cover rather strategic issues and are not so detailed (at the procurement stage). 
More details on the corresponding sets of indicators are reported in Table 3, in the 
appendix. 
 
In the third stage of the research, we identified three groups of coops that shared 
similar brand orientation or choice of the distribution channel. Furthermore, for 




Because we analyze the SCN from the cooperative’s point of view, we consider it as 
an integrator in the chain and concentrate on its relationships with the upstream 
(procurement) and downstream (distribution) collaborators. Thus, we will discuss 
vertical cooperation in the context of the various strategic settings. 
 
All cooperatives must grow to stay in the market place. However, they apply 
different strategies. To overcome the competition they modify their production 
profile, which leads to a kind of market segmentation and mitigates direct rivalry 
among firms. Basically, they move toward specialization on either the white or 
yellow production line or they extend their production to offer highly diversified 
goods of both lines. The interviews indicate that firms use both cost-leadership, and 
to varying degrees, product differentiation strategies. Because Poland is still one of 
the poorer OECD countries, cost orientation is regarded as a competitive necessity 
for all coops. However, because there is an increasing income disparity among 
Polish consumers, the market segregation process is being strengthened, which 
leads to an evolution of various marketing strategies among the cooperatives. Thus, 
on the one hand, the majority of dairies are still rather unbranded, but on the other 
hand, they hold some of the best-known Polish “fast-moving consumer goods” 
brands. This variety is also mirrored in the distribution process of the dairy 
products. Either the products are sold through retailers (supermarket and discount 
chains and local supermarkets) or they are traded to wholesalers, who distribute 
them to the retailers. Less often, coops sell their products to industrial customers 
for further processing or catering services. 
 
Catalyzed by the high pressure of downstream stages, almost all dairies comply 
with mandatory EU standards such as the hygiene standards currently stipulated 
in regulations (EC) No. 852/2004 and 853/2004. However, three plants have still not Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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adjusted to those standards; they were granted a transitional period until the end of 
2006 to accomplish all needed modernizations. Procedures based on the concept of 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) are widely used to minimize 
the risks of food safety hazards and to facilitate adherence to the mandatory 
minimum quality standards. All of the investigated plants have already installed 
the HACCP system, most of them even before EU accession (2004). However, 
implementing that concept has been compulsory for all food business operators in 
the EU since January 2006. Thus, the competitive advantages of HACCP 
implementation have been gained solely by early adopters, who can currently 
benefit from cost savings and learning experiences. Besides the mandatory food 
safety standards, voluntary (public and private) quality schemes are used by most 
of the investigated dairies. Schemes in use are ISO 9001:2000, ISO 14001, BRC, 
IFS, and some national concepts. Four coops declared ongoing adjustment processes 
to introduce the food safety management system ISO 22000:2005. Two other firms 
produce kosher food, which require its own quality schemes. The investigated group 
outperforms the sectoral average as far as the implementation of the private quality 
schemes is concerned. However, once the schemes are used throughout the market, 
they become less relevant as competitive strategies. Furthermore, those schemes 
operate within the chain, but the consumer may not be aware of their existence at 
the point of final food purchase. This drives the coops to develop and strengthen 
their brands. All coops understand quality as a mechanism to reach the needs and 
wants of consumers. This indicates that food quality in Poland is more than plain 
food safety and the ability to continuously reproduce an ex ante defined set of 
attributes.  
 
Relationships at the distribution stage vary from loose or tacit agreements that are 
almost spot market transactions, to stable, long-term, and trust-based contracts. 
Usually the partnership between a coop, export companies, wholesalers, and local 
independent supermarkets or outlets has a strict operational character, whereas 
partnership with retail chains or manufacturers with foreign investments is a more 
strategic one. Though relationships to downstream business partners are fairly 
heterogeneous for each coop, not surprisingly, the relationships with farmers, 
almost all of them being members, show some similarities among cooperatives. 
Besides information transfer between the coop and the farmers (consulting, choice 
of production techniques), the coops offer their members credits or access to credits 
for investments in growth and specialization of the farms. For example, coops use 
quality-dependent payment schemes to achieve better raw milk quality. Additional 
provisions also exist, including a price premium for extraordinary quality (super 
extra), and direct delivery for veterinary bureau-approved farms, or farms which 
possess certain breeds of milk cows. 
 
All cooperatives pay a price premium on membership. Consequently, payment 
schemes differ greatly between firms. However, in all pricing mechanisms, the price 
increases as compliance with quality requirements set by the purchaser increases. Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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Although the formal design of the relationships with their members appear very 
similar, significant differences in the intensity of the relationships were found.  
 
Operative or Strategic Quality Management? 
  
Even though all coops had an explicit corporate strategy, including topics on 
member’s relationships, there is no empirical evidence of an explicit collective 
strategy covering all stages of the food chain. However, results indicate that there is 
a link between the chosen quality strategy, the dominant distribution channel, the 
design of the respective partnerships, and the applied quality management scheme. 
We define a distribution channel as dominant if a firm sells more than 70% of its 
product through that channel. In this respect, we were able to distinguish three 
main groups of firms in the sample: (1) coops that do not have a strong brand and 
mostly deliver directly to retailers and an industrial purchaser with foreign direct 
investment; (2) coops with strong brands; (3) coops of non-branded goods or those 
with weak brands, with wholesalers being the main purchaser. A concrete example 
of each group can be found in the appendix. And even though these three coops are 
individual cases, they mirror the particularities of each group.  
 
Group 1:  
 
Because most of the coops do not have strong brands and therefore do not have to 
carry the chain responsibility, we do not consider them as focal companies. In this 
case, direct purchasers (retailers and manufacturer) are the focal companies. 
Therefore, coops regard direct purchasers as the standard-setting entities and 
adjust their quality strategies and management schemes as required. In these 
cases, cooperatives have to meet - at least - all mandatory quality standards and 
schemes. 
 
a.  If a coop supplies a highly-specialized industrial customer, specific quality 
requirements have to be met (i.e., unique chemical or physical parameters). 
We found that the partners jointly carried out many of the relation-specific 
investments, which first concerned quality improvements at the procurement 
stage, and then the adoption of new processing technologies. Adherence to the 
specific requirements is ensured by close business-to-business (B2B) 
relations, including some knowledge sharing routines and enhanced 
monitoring. Additionally, in such direct relationships the threat of direct and 
strong sanctions (losing the focal purchaser) limits opportunistic behavior 
and facilitates cooperative adaptation by the coop. At the same time, the high 
intensity of unexpected controls and enhanced monitoring suggests that the 
focal firm either does not trust the partner or must steadily improve its 
knowledge about the partner’s capability, as well as the correctness of the 
process. 
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b.  If a dairy sells its products to a retail chain and the retailer then sells them 
as proprietary private label products, implementing retailer-specific schemes 
will be required. Thus, processors are obliged to voluntarily implement 
standards for auditing retailer-branded food products, such as IFS and BRC. 
Interestingly, retailers are satisfied if those concepts are running but do not 
need to be certified, which seems to be specific for an emerging market. In 
this case, quality standards are used to coordinate pooled interdependencies. 
We found that focal firms prefer control-based relationships rather than 
trust-based ones to govern partnership behaviors and the maintenance of 
their specific requirements. In particular, retailers with strong bargaining 
power apply restrictive control mechanisms, even if the running quality 
concepts are certified. Adjustment to the retailer-specific requirements 
involves investing in specialized resources, which increases the coops’ 
dependence on retailers. However, because IFS and BRC are widely used 
standards, the coops have formal access to alternative institutional customers 
on the national or international markets. 
 
Contracts and managerial discretion are used to meet sequential interdependencies. 
The contracts contain specifics on quality and payment. As long as these specifics 
are met, the duration is prolonged. Additionally, we found some reciprocal 
interdependencies among the partners in B2B relationships between the coops and 
the industrial purchaser. Overall, the relationships between the focal companies 
and the dairies are very intense. Therefore, the type of partnering is more strategic 
than operational. 
 
Regarding the relationship between coops and their members, we found that the 
coops encourage growth strategies by intensive consulting assistance aimed at 
selecting larger farmers. Overall, we conclude that supply chain networks are 
established and chain quality management is exercised. However, even though the 
partnering can be described as more strategic in nature, there is a lack of a 
collective quality strategy. Thus, we would classify the paradigm as operational 
chain quality management. Because more and more retailers are bringing their 
proprietary private label products to the market, there exists increasing price 
competition among the products. For the concerned coops, this means that they face 
strong pressure on costs, which precludes resource allocation to more sophisticated 
quality management systems. 
 
Group 2:  
 
When cooperatives dispose of a strong brand they adopt the network position of a 
focal company. Because Polish consumers appreciate the freshness, taste, and 
safety and reliability of well-branded food products, credence attributes such as 
environmental friendliness or animal welfare are of minor strategic importance. 
Nonetheless, the coops have recognized that they must actively design their Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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distribution opportunities. For all channels – retail, wholesale, and export – they 
use medium- and long-term contracts, which contain many details addressing 
product quality matters. Thus, the coops control, to some extent, quality 
measurements that are external to the firm.  
 
Moreover, coops use partnering mechanisms that are more strategic in nature, so 
marketing information such as point-of-sale data is exchanged. Co-marketing is 
particularly intensive in partnerships with retail chains, because it is based on 
ongoing negotiations and adjustments addressing sales strategies, promotions, and 
pricing behavior. Typically, this leads to complex reciprocal interdependencies, 
which demand well-defined organizational principles and a certain level of 
management skills to govern the relationships. Such relation-specific systems seem 
to be unique to individual chains of branded products manufacturers. 
 
All mandatory standards and schemes are implemented because the brands stand 
for high quality. However, the use of private standards is not as homogenous. While 
all manufacturers of branded products use intensive ISO quality standards, only 
three coops have implemented ISO standards on environmental management and 
posses an adequate certificate that integrates both systems. Respondents of those 
coops stressed that the main incentive for implementing the voluntary 
environmental standards was to demonstrate their environmental concerns, and 
hence to increase their reputation and brand loyalty. However, all of the coops 
declared an intention to implement the environmental standards in the near future 
for the same reason. 
 
Interaction at the procurement stage can also be described as intensive. Using 
incentives to upgrade the quality of raw milk, coops exert a firm boundary 
overlapping quality schemes. Some of the actions result from the implementation of 
ISO quality standards, which require objectives for quality to be included in the 
quality policy and to be leveraged to the upstream stages. Additionally, the coops 
provide intensive consulting assistance and herd management for their members. 
One coop even provided business angles as an alternative know-how source 
(technology transfer) as early as the beginning of the 1990s. In this case we can 
consider it as a strategic chain quality concept. 
 
Group 3:  
 
This group contains processors of non-branded goods or those with weak brands sold 
mainly to wholesalers and local independent retailers, such as small supermarkets 
and outlets. The relationships between coops and those direct purchasers cannot be 
described as being of a collaborative nature. Instead, arm-length, traditional, spot 
market transactions dominate. Typically, loose contracts are used for dealing with 
financial matters as well as some basic quality matters such as the product Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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expiration date. Therefore, because there is no chain network there is also no chain 
quality management. 
 
The dairies are usually ‘white line’ manufacturers and emphasize offering their 
products at the cheapest price (price leadership). This requires a strong cost 
orientation, with cost leadership being achieved by economies of scale, producing 
basic products, and improving the efficiency of all business operations, i.e., by 
partners’ selection. Because there is no dominant standard-setting purchaser, the 
dairies have some freedom in their choice of quality strategies and measures to 
guarantee the effectiveness of those strategies. Because of this strong cost 
orientation, it is not surprising that the processors apply mandatory standards and 
schemes and restrict their relationships with suppliers to basic commitments and 
principals as regulated in the cooperatives’ act. Nevertheless, the coops’ 
relationships seem to be better developed at the procurement stage than at the 
distribution stage. We identified operational partnerships between the coops and 
their milk suppliers, as well as some dyadic actions addressing the chosen quality 
strategy at this stage, but the recognition of similar interests and initiatives to 
explore even operational advantages in relationships with their institutional 
customers is still lacking. 
 
Even though the dairies rely on cost leadership for their competitive advantage, 
they have to deliver safe and reliable food and differentiate the products at least in 
a minor way to make them more attractive for the consumer. Because the firms do 
not posses a strong brand, they use voluntary public quality certifications and labels 
to signal quality. Dairies commonly use standards developed and assigned by the 
Polish Center for Testing and Certification (PCBC), such as “Q” (quality) and Eco” 
(ecological), as well as “PN” (the product and process conform with the Polish 
norms). Some standards promote national food products of high and reliable quality, 
such as the “Try Fine Food” standards (PDZ) designed by the Polish Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. However, the relevance of those signals is 
decreasing as well-known retailers establish private labels and manufacturers’ 
brands in the market. 
 
Still, coops belonging to the third group can gain attractive profits, although price 
competition is increasing. The ongoing development of retailers and wholesalers 
with strong bargaining power will force the dairies to either join their SCN or take 
the role of a focal company, and hence to strengthen their own brand. Independent 
of that, the dairy must first create its supply chain network and develop a chain 
quality management. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Nowadays, food is perceived as a complex bundle of characteristics, with an 
increasing level of importance placed on credence attributes relating to product and Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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methods of food production (e.g. environmental friendliness). Food processors and 
retailers must re-design their food chains in such a way that all stages are involved 
in meeting the requested ‘new quality.’ Therefore, the coordination mechanisms of 
existing food chains have to be altered, because spot market transactions are unable 
to properly coordinate the exchange of credence attributes. These must be 
substituted by transactions in vertically-coordinated chain organizations. Such 
higher coordinated chain organizations are either hybrids or vertically-integrated 
firms. There is evidence that the majority of these agro-food chain systems are 
organized as vertical networks, i.e., supply chain networks. 
 
Supply chain networks are strategic networks that demand a collective strategy and 
common chain management. Chain management must incorporate the relationships 
and interdependencies of the member firms, as well as problems arising at the firm 
level, the dyadic level, and the network level. In this article, we have differentiated 
between operative chain quality management and strategic chain quality 
management.  
 
Operative chain quality approaches address food safety and risk issues as well as 
efficiency issues. The operative chain quality management systems pursue the 
paramount objective of minimizing health safety risks caused by food 
contamination. Chain-adapted standardization systems such as ISO, QS, and IFS 
are used for this purpose. Operative approaches are mainly tools for achieving 
parity with competing SCNs, whereas a strategic chain quality system can be used 
to achieve a qualitative competitive advantage. Strategic chain quality management 
considers additional quality attributes, which are credence characteristics. 
However, we do not argue that every SCN needs strategic chain management; 
rather, only if a SCN has a strategic aim such as being a trusted brand. Thus, the 
challenge for the focal firm is to choose that quality approach which best fits its 
overall network aims and performance. 
 
In emerging markets, limited consumer demand for high quality goods, especially 
for credence attributes, is still the main barrier for upgrading quality management 
systems. At the same time, firms in those markets face high adjustment costs due to 
the changing market environment, including legally and voluntarily obliged 
requirements, and ongoing restructuring processes at the procurement and 
distribution stage. Both effects facilitate the strong cost orientation of the firms, 
and hence the tendency to apply and remain with the operative quality 
management. 
 
The example of the Polish dairy market shows that firms’ activities are generally 
aligned with current market opportunities for optimal enterprise performance. All 
firms must deliver safe and reliable food and differentiate the products at least in a 
minor way to make them more attractive to the consumer. Overall, we conclude that 
in most cases, supply chain networks are established and chain quality Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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management is exercised. However, this is only the case if there is a focal actor that 
influences its network structure. The results show that retail chains and industrial 
purchasers with foreign investment and strong bargaining power usually take the 
position of the focal firm in the SCN. In those cases, strategic partnering between 
the individual chain stages dominates. However, because there is a lack of a 
collective quality strategy overlapping all actors in this case, the quality 
management initiatives are still operational. 
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that Polish manufacturers of well-branded products 
can adopt the position of the focal firm in the SCN as well. Thus, those dairies must 
carry the chain responsibility for quality. For this reason, they apply more 
sophisticated quality assurance schemes and use governance mechanisms, which 
are unique for an individual chain and usually strategic in nature. As a strategic 
center, the processors focus on the chosen quality strategy and clearly guide the 
partnership in arms-length ties at the procurement and distribution stages. Thus, a 
collective quality strategy is observed. Overall, we conclude that manufacturers of 
well-branded products in Poland perform strategic quality management. These 
findings confirm our theoretical considerations and indicate that the behavior of 
those firms is universal, and holds for both mature and emerging industries. 
There are still some Polish dairies that are not embedded in any SCN. These 
concern processors of non-branded goods or those with weak brands who sell their 
products to purchasers without a focal position. Because there is no powerful focal 
firm in the chain, no managerial discretion can be exerted and no chain quality 
management concepts can be installed. Thus, we could only identify operational 
partnerships between the coops and their milk suppliers, and some dyadic actions 
addressing the chosen quality strategy at the procurement stage. In contrast, at the 
distribution stage we observed that the partners do not share homogenous interests 
regarding quality issues; there is even a lack of dyadic initiatives that aim to 
explore the operational advantages of the cooperation. 
 
However, even those dairies not embedded in a SCN have recognized the 
importance of quality for their market success. Because of the strong cost 
orientation, the processors continue to apply mandatory standards and often use 
public labels and certificates to signal their quality. Attractive profits are still 
possible with this strategy, but the increasing price competition among the basic 
products and the further development of retailers and wholesalers with strong 
bargaining power will force the dairies either to join their SCN or to take the role of 
a focal company and strengthen their brand. Independent of that, the dairy first 
must create its supply chain network and develop a chain quality management. 
Our empirical results indicate that a profound diversity of quality management 
approaches exist among Polish milk supply chains. However, one thing is 
unambiguous: the chosen quality strategy determines the design of the vertical 
coordination mechanism. Thus, the higher the product requirements, the further Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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quality management systems go beyond a firm’s boundaries and the stronger is the 
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Table 1: Relevance of the investigated sample for the Polish dairy industry in 2005 
  Milk 




No. of milk 
suppliers 










Share in the industry  41%  31%  14%  25%  24% 
Source:  Interviewed sample of 19 Polish milk cooperatives, ARR (2006), ZPPM (2005), KZSM (2005), GUS 
(2006). 




Table 2: Structure of the investigated sample 
Distribution structure 












Minimum 0.01 0.00  0.02 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mean 0.25  0.26  0.33 0.11  0.50  0.12 
Maximum 0.90 0.58  0.89 0.80  0.25  0.58 
Procurement stage 
  Share of direct deliveries to the coops   
 
Procured milk  Milk holdings 




Minimum 0.40  0.10  0.90   
Mean 0.44 0.76  0.96   
Maximum 1.00  1.00  0.99   
Quality standards and schemes 
  Mandatory Voluntary 
Hygiene 
standards1) 
HACCP  ISO 9001  ISO 14001  BRC IFS  Kosher  No. of plants 
adequately 
certified 39 24  14  4  1  1  2 
Source:  Interviewed sample of 19 Polish milk cooperatives. 
Note:  Hygiene standards and rules for production and marketing of raw milk and milk-based products as 
  regulated in Council Directive 92/46/ECC until 31 December 2005 and in the regulations (EC) No. 
  852/2004 and 853/2004 since January 2006. 
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Table 3: Indicators for operative and strategic quality management 
  Operative quality management  Strategic quality management 
Aim of the 
SCN 
-  to gain parity with competing networks regarding   
   food quality 
-  to achieve cost leadership & provide generic   
   products at cheapest possible price 
- to create long-term, enduring competitive      
  advantages, using quality as differentiating    
  parameters 




- safety, reliability & maintainability of final      
   products 
- first understanding, thereafter meeting customer   
   preferences 
- lack of a collective quality strategy 
high 
- additional quality attributes (credence, tradition) 
- exceeding consumer needs (environmental, social    
   justice) 
- generating new demand (market segmentation via   
  new brands development) 
- collective quality strategy given 
Branding/ 
labeling 
- no/ weak brand; generic products 
- public quality certificates and labels dominate,  
  i.e., “PN”-label indicating that the product and  
  process conform with Polish norms or “Try Fine  
  Food” standards (PDZ) 
- premium brands, brand management given 
- investments in brand, reputation and reduction of  
  information asymmetry about product quality    




minimum quality standards 
- mandatory hygiene standards as regulated by the  
  EU, i.e., CD 92/46 or (EC) 853/2004 
- mandatory food safety programs (HACCP) 
- standardization systems addressing history and  
  operations transparency requirements (IFS, ISO   
  9000); the concepts are running, but are often not  
  certified 
superior norms/value-adding schemes 
- earlier standards-adopter 
- certificates of ISO standards on environmental &  
   quality management (ISO 14001, ISO 9001) 
- intention to introduce up-to-date food safety  
   systems (HACCP/ISO 22000) 
- standardization systems addressing strategic  
   transparency requirements (kosher food, industry  
   outperforming activities regarding processing of  





- short- or medium-term 
- operating partnering schemes dominate 
- low intensity of relationships 
- control-based relationships dominate 
- on-going, long-term 
- unique partnering concept/hard to imitate 
- mutuality (mutual adjustments, shared  
  relationship-specific investments, knowledge  
  sharing routines, cooperation management) 
- high level of control/trust to risk minimization,  





- short- and medium-term, unstable 
- restrictive control mechanisms exercised by the  
  focal company (retailers) 
Contracts 
- loose, flexible, long-term, formal (fixed terms:  
   partnership duration, payment schemes, general   
   quality requirements; flexible terms:      
   amount/composition of delivery, price) 
- short-term contracts (rather explicit, detailed,  
   cover many specifications; quality and timely  




- ongoing negotiations and adjustments addressing  
   sales strategies (exchange of point-of-sale data,  
   promotions, pricing behavior) 
Contracts 
- medium- and long-term, formal, 
   address both partnership-specific and relatively  





- basic intensity as regulated in a coop act  
   (consulting assistance, financial support) 
- short-term economic incentives regarding milk    
  quality improvements dominate (price premium  
  for meeting mandatory quality standards, credits  
  for milking & milk cooling equipment) 
Contracts 
- medium-term, formal, delivery contracts  
  (minimum quantity and quality of delivery,  
  payment schemes, basic responsibilities and rights  
  as regulated in a coop act) 
Partnering 
- sustainable, long-term collaborations (shared  
   investments, well-developed feedback     
   mechanisms, business angels, herd management) 
- high degree of mutual loyalty (sample out trust 
  level of goodwill and competence, trust) 
- additional incentives to upgrade the raw milk  
  quality (price premium for superior milk quality,  
  markdown for no valid quality certificates) 
Contracts 
- no formal (delivery) contracts or indefinite    
  collaboration contracts covering strategic issues and 
  addressing principles set in  the respective coop act 
Source: Interviewed sample of 19 Polish milk cooperatives.  Hanf and Pieniadz. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007 
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 Appendix:  B 







Technology specific quality standards of the main industrial customer, i.e. chemical, physical parameters
Quality label of the German Agricultural Society (DLG); important quality signal, since Germany is the main export country








ISO 9002 ISO 9001 BRC
2003
Hygiene standards as reg. in 
CD 92/46 or (EC) 853/2004
Implemented
Specialisation: yellow line 
Economies of scale
Focus on one product (cheddar) and one business customer
Modernisation, mechanisation of the technological process
Improving efficiency of all business operations,  i.e. by partners’ selection
No brand management (costs)
Cost orientation 
Competitive strategy Growth strategy
/
Hard cheese / Germany 









Quality understanding of the co-op
Branding
Small / regional in central Poland
Company name and logo, safety, objective quality attributes (i.e. reliability and maintainability of final products, 
technological parameters of paramount importance) 





Relationships at the distribution stage / dominating business customers
Quality standards and schemes
Relationships at the procurement stage / milk suppliers
Operative
Loose agreements ----------------------------------------------------e x p l i c i t ,  h i g h  r equirements
S h o r t - t e r m   ------------------------------l ong-term  --------------------------------u n l i m i t e d
Strategic
Content of contracts 7/8 of it Æ one customer








in a co-op act






















in a co-op act





breed of milk cows
premium for 
extraordinary milk quality 
Quality-related payment 
scheme for raw milk  
Operative Strategic     Partnering
∅ Delivery / supplier: 42,000  l milk per year 
Share of direct deliveries: 53% of all milk holdings 
82% of total milk procurement
Contracts: posses 80% of milk suppliers (formal, medium-term delivery cont.) 
No. of employees  187
No. of plants  1
Milk procurement: 118 million litre p.a. 







Loose agreements ----------------------------------------------------e x p l i c i t ,  h i g h  r equirements
S h o r t - t e r m   ------------------------------l ong-term  --------------------------------u n l i m i t e d
Strategic
Content of contracts Product: hard cheese
Country: Germany, USA, Canada  
Export 15%
Partnering




Loose agreements ----------------------------------------------------e x p l i c i t ,  h i g h  r equirements
S h o r t - t e r m   ------------------------------l ong-term  --------------------------------u n l i m i t e d
Strategic
Content of contracts (dominates Makro) 
Wholesalers  < 3%
Partnering









However, only with large milk suppliers
large milk suppliers
Example of SCN performing operative quality management
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safety /   stability To understand /  reach customer preferences   To outperform customer preferences To generate the demand
2003 2002
No No 2003 1999
2003
Voluntary Mandatory
Two national public quality certificates and labels, granted for the co-op’s cottage cheese:
“Q”-label, indicating extraordinary quality, assigned in 2001 by the Polish Centre for Testing and Certification (PCBC) 
“Try Fine Food” label (PDZ), assigned in 2000 by the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.








ISO 9002 ISO 9001 BRC
2001 by few production lines
2003 by all production lines
Hygiene standards as reg. in 







Specialisation: white line 
Economies of scale
Focus on white line production
Cost savings due to early adoption
of higher technologies 
Cost orientation
Competitive strategy Growth strategy
cottage cheese / Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic
cottage cheese / Poland
Present products
/
New products: hard cheese







Quality understanding of the co-op
Branding
High / Poland
Company name, signal for high product quality (i.e. taste, freshness, safety, reliability, environmental 
friendliness, social justice), and long tradition of high quality production and brand image
Strong, single brand,  focal company 





Relationships at the distribution stage / dominating business customers
Quality standards and schemes
Relationships at the procurement stage / milk suppliers
Operative
L o o s e  a g r e e m e n t s  ----------------------------------------------------e x p l i c i t ,  h i g h  r e q u i r e m e n t s
Short-term  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - long-term  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - unlimited
Strategic
Content of contracts allmost all chains in Poland, i.e. 








in a co-op act






















in a co-op act





breeds of milk cows
premium for 
extraordinary milk quality 
Quality-related payment 
scheme for raw milk  
Operative Strategic     Partnering
∅ Delivery / supplier: 62,000  l milk per year 
Share of direct deliveries: 45% of all milk holdings 
76% of total milk procurement
Contracts: posses 40% of milk suppliers (indefinite collaboration contracts) 
No. of employees  340
No. of plants  1
Milk procurement: 111 million litre p.a. 







L o o s e  a g r e e m e n t s  ----------------------------------------------------e x p l i c i t ,  h i g h  r e q u i r e m e n t s









L o o s e  a g r e e m e n t s  ----------------------------------------------------e x p l i c i t ,  h i g h  r e q u i r e m e n t s














large milk suppliers 
are preferred
Example of SCN performing strategic quality management
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safety /   stability To understand /  reach customer preferences   To outperform customer preferences To generate the demand
Voluntary Mandatory
National public quality certifications and labels, i.e.
“PN”-label indicating that the product and process conform with the Polish norms 







„no intention, since no expectation of additional profits”
ISO 9002 ISO 9001 BRC
Main factory: 2001 (milk powder)
2004: all products 
2nd plant: transitional  period
Hygiene standards as reg. in 
CD 92/46 or (EC) 853/2004
Implemented
Specialisation: yellow line 
– acquired plant –
Specialisation: white line 
– holding company / main factory –
Economies of scale and scope
Focus on basic products
Well-developed resource base
Improving efficiency of business operations,






Competitive strategy Growth strategy
/
Milk powder / export markets 











Quality understanding of the co-op
Branding
High-Medium / regional in central-eastern Poland
Company name, objective quality attributes (i.e. taste, stability) and credence attributes (safety)





Relationships at the distribution stage / dominating business customers
Quality standards and schemes
Relationships at the procurement stage / milk suppliers
Operative
Loose agreements - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - explicit, high requirements
S h o r t - t e r m   ------------------------------l o n g - t e r m   --------------------------------u n l i m i t e d
Strategic
Content of contracts 20% of it -> retail chains







in a co-op act



























breeds of milk cows
premium for 
extraordinary milk quality 
Quality-related payment 
scheme for raw milk  
Operative Strategic     Partnering
∅ Delivery / supplier: 45,000  l milk per year 
Share of direct deliveries: 50% of all milk holdings 
80% of total milk procurement
Contracts: posses all milk suppliers (formal, short-term delivery contracts)
No. of employees  600
No. of plants  2
Milk procurement: 154 million litre p.a. 
No. of milk suppliers: 3,500
Co-op 
characteristic





Loose agreements - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - explicit, high requirements
S h o r t - t e r m   ------------------------------l o n g - t e r m   --------------------------------u n l i m i t e d
Strategic
Content of contracts Product: mainly milk powder
Country: UE, Mexico, Cuba  
Export 10%
Partnering




Loose agreements - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - explicit, high requirements
S h o r t - t e r m   ------------------------------l o n g - t e r m   --------------------------------u n l i m i t e d
Strategic
Content of contracts
Retail chains  << 1%
Partnering









Example of processor that is not embedded in any SCN
 